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To make adaptive choices, humans need to estimate the probability of future events. Based on a Bayesian approach, it is assumed that
probabilities are inferred by combining a priori, potentially subjective, knowledge with factual observations, but the precise neurobio-
logical mechanism remains unknown. Here, we study whether neural encoding centers on subjective posterior probabilities, and data
merely lead to updates of posteriors, or whether objective data are encoded separately alongside subjective knowledge. During fMRI,
young adults acquired prior knowledge regarding uncertain events, repeatedly observed evidence in the form of stimuli, and estimated
event probabilities. Participants combined prior knowledge with factual evidence using Bayesian principles. Expected reward inferred
from prior knowledge was encoded in striatum. BOLD response in specific nodes of the default mode network (angular gyri, posterior
cingulate, andmedial prefrontal cortex) encoded the actual frequency of stimuli, unaffected by prior knowledge. In this network, activity
increasedwith frequencies and thus reflected the accumulationof evidence. In contrast, Bayesianposterior probabilities, computed from
prior knowledge and stimulus frequencies, were encoded in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus.Here activity increased for improbable events
and thus signaled the violation of Bayesian predictions. Thus, subjective beliefs and stimulus frequencies were encoded in separate
cortical regions. The advantage of such a separation is that objective evidence can be recombined with newly acquired knowledge when
a reinterpretation of the evidence is called for. Overall this study reveals the coexistence in the brain of an experience-based system of
inference and a knowledge-based system of inference.
Introduction
When facing a familiar environment, people rely on a priori
knowledge to anticipate future events (Neisser, 1976; Bar, 2007).
This ability develops in early childhood (Te´gla´s et al., 2011).
However, predictions often need to be adjusted when new obser-
vations are made because our knowledge about situations and
people is often incomplete or biased (e.g., stereotypes). That is,
our “internal model” of the world is only partial and objective
evidence is needed to complete our beliefs.
Bayes’ law provides a disciplined way to combine objective
data with subjective prior beliefs. Behavioral studies have sug-
gested that humans apply Bayesian principles when updating
their knowledge (Peterson and Miller, 1965; Phillips and Ed-
wards, 1966). Recent evidence has emerged in sensory decision
making that uncertainty of prior knowledge relative to that of
newdata determines howposterior beliefs are formed, andneural
signals of the corresponding uncertainty measures are beginning
to be identified (Vilares et al., 2012). In the present study, we do
not focus on the uncertainty of sensory information but on its
probability of occurrence. Indeed, probabilities provide crucial
information to predict what will happen next (d’Acremont and
Bossaerts, 2012).
Both fMRI and EEG studies have shown that the brain re-
sponse to uncertain stimuli depends on their actual frequency of
occurrence. In the “odd ball” paradigm, a larger event-related
potential (the P300) has been recorded for rare stimuli (Duncan-
Johnson andDonchin, 1977;Mars et al., 2008).During reinforce-
ment learning, authors have related BOLD activity in lateral
parietal and prefrontal cortex to the occurrence of rare outcomes
(Fletcher et al., 2001; Turner et al., 2004; Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
Recently, it has been shown that the brain tracks the probability
of up to 10 different stimuli in inferior parietal cortex andmedial
prefrontal cortex as well as their entropy in bilateral insula
(d’Acremont et al., 2013). Missing, however, is a neurobiological
account of how prior knowledge is merged with new factual evi-
dence to form beliefs (Fig. 1).
Based on the literature and theoretical considerations, one can
formulate several hypotheses. The first possibility is that regionspre-
viously found to react to likely (d’Acremont et al., 2013) or surpris-
ingevents (Gla¨scher et al., 2010)donot incorporatepriorknowledge
when this factor is manipulated experimentally; thus these regions
would encode stimulus frequencies. Another possibility is that
BOLD signal in these regions incorporates prior knowledge. Such a
result would support the Bayesian brain hypothesis. Bayes’ rule does
not require memory of past data, but only memory of the last fore-
cast [like in the Kalman filter (Meinhold and Singpurwalla, 1983)].
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Thusaneural signatureofBayesianprobabilitiesdoesnotnecessitate
the encoding of factual frequencies. A third scenario is that some of
the regions found tobe sensitive to stimulusprobabilities inprevious
studies are specialized in encoding frequencies, while others incor-
poratepriorknowledge inaBayesianway.Our results favor the third
hypothesis and point to the existence of a dual system of statistical
inference in the brain.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Twenty-six participants took part in the study (11 women and 15 men).
Themedian agewas 23 years old (minimum, 18;maximum, 37). Twenty-
four were students, graduate students, or postdoctorate students at the
California Institute of Technology. Two were working outside of the
college. The study took place at the Caltech Brain Imaging Center and
was approved by the institutional review board.
Participants read the task instructions on the computer screen and
practiced with two demonstration trials before the fMRI scanning. Par-
ticipants began the sessionwith $1 playmoney. The net payoff received in
each trial was added to the playmoney. At the end of the experiment, they
received four times the final play money in real currency (U.S. dollars).
This variable amount was added to a fixed amount given for the partici-
pation in the study.
Task design
In our paradigm, participants were asked to estimate the probability of
uncertain stimuli based on a priori information as well as repeated em-
pirical observations. We tracked brain activity as evidence (stimuli) was
accumulated. In our weather analogy (Fig. 1), evidence would corre-
spond to the weather experienced each day. In addition, the reward
associated with a stimulus was manipulated independently of its proba-
bility of occurrence, so the evidence was affectively neutral on average. In
the weather analogy (Fig. 1), the decision maker might want to ski on
Thursday. Thus “snow” would be a positively valued outcome. Con-
versely, he might need to drive, so that “snow” would be a bad outcome.
The task thus introduced a distinction between objective and subjective
probabilities while controlling for the effect of value.
Two novel tasks were developed to test the hypotheses presented in the
introduction. The two tasks shared a common principle: participants
received prior but incomplete information about the likelihood of ob-
serving twomutually exclusive stimuli. They later had the opportunity to
refine their prediction after observing the factual occurrence of the stim-
uli. However, the causal model generating the stimuli differed between
the two tasks. This strategy was followed to test the robustness of our
findings and enhance the generality of the results.
Stimuli presented in the two tasks were distinguished by their color. In
the first task, the ball betting task, prior information was given on the
proportion of red and blue balls in a unique bin. Participants bet whether
the ball drawn next would be of a designated color (red or blue; Fig. 2a).
In the second task, the bin betting task, prior information was given on
the probability that balls would be drawn from a designated bin (right or
left). The two bins contained a different proportion of green and orange
balls and participants bet whether ball drawings came from the desig-
nated bin (Fig. 2b). Participants were asked to bet on the ball/bin associ-
atedwith the $1 payoff. In Figure 2 for instance, they had to bet on the red
ball in the ball betting task and the right bin in the bin betting task. In half
of the trials, the payoff was associated to the other ball/bin. With this
design, stimulus probability and reward were statistically independent
(see below, Randomization).
Each trial was divided into six periods. In the prior informationperiod,
a range of possible probability was revealed bymoving two triangles on a
horizontal scale. The computer chose a value p between the triangles (p
was not revealed). In the ball betting task, p determined the true proba-
bility that a ball associated with the $1 payoff (Fig. 2a, red ball) would be
drawn from the bin. In the bin betting task, p determined the true prob-
ability that balls came from a designated bin (Fig. 2b, right bin). In the
sampling period, objective empirical evidence was generated by repeat-
edly drawing balls (with replacement). Between one and nine balls were
drawn. To ensure that participants carefully attended to each drawing,
we randomly ended the drawing in each trial. In the subsequent betting
period, participants bet between $0 and $1 on the color of the next ball (in
the ball betting task) or on the designated bin (in the bin betting task) by
moving a vertical gray line along the horizontal scale (participants placed
their bet at the end of the sampling period, not after each drawing). As
indicated previously, the ball (red/blue) or bin (right/left) they bet onwas
the one associated with the $1 payoff.
After the bet was chosen, we ran a second price auction to determine
payoffs. This method was selected because it incites participants to accu-
rately report their estimation of probabilities (Becker et al., 1964). In the
auction period, the computer revealed a price by moving a vertical violet
bar between $0 and $1. Participants won the auction if the bet was strictly
higher than this random price. If the bet was equal or smaller than the
computer price, the auction was lost. In the final outcome period, an
additional ball was drawn in the ball betting task and the bin was revealed
in the bin betting task. The earning for the current trial was shown in the
feedback period. In case the auction was won, the payoff was $1 if the
additional ball drawn was of the designated color (ball betting task) or if
the bin from which balls had been drawn was the designated one (bin
betting task). Otherwise the payoff was zero. The net payoff equaled the
payoff minus the computer drawn price. Net payoff could be negative. In
case the auction was lost, the net payoff was always zero. At the end of the
auction, the net payoff was added to the play money. The details of the
auction made it optimal to place a bet equal to the probability to obtain
the $1 payoff (see below, Predictive models for choices). To avoid errors
due to amisunderstanding of the second price auction, the optimal strat-
egy was made explicit in the task instruction.
Randomization
The value of p that determined the probability of the final outcome
was chosen from a uniform distribution between the two triangles. To
vary the uncertainty about the prior information, the distance d be-
tween the triangles changed from one trial to the other. In the ball
betting task, the distance could be 0.25, 0.50, or 1. The computer
selected one of the three possible distances with equal likelihood. The
position of the triangles on the scale was determined by two values: a
and b. The value a was chosen between 0 and 1  d from a uniform
distribution. The value b was defined as a  d.
In the bin betting task, the three possible distances between the trian-
gles were 0, 0.25, and 0.50. Positions a and b of the triangles were deter-
mined as in the ball betting task. For the distance 0, the triangles were
superimposed and determined the exact prior. Note that contrary to the
bin betting task, the distance between the triangles was never zero in the
ball betting task. Otherwise the proportion of balls in the (unique) urn
would have been known exactly, obviating the need for learning.
There was at least one drawing in the sampling period. Subsequently,
there was a 20% chance that the sampling would end after each drawing.
Themaximumnumber of drawings was nine. Thus the number of draw-
ings ranged from one to nine.
Figure 1. Illustration where a person intends to predict whether it will snow on Thursday. On
Sundaynight, thepersonwatchesaweatherforecast, leadingtotheformationofapriorbelief.During
thenext3d, thepersonobserves factualweather information.OnMondayandTuesday it snows,but
Wednesday is sunny. To make a prediction onWednesday night, it is adaptive to take into account
both the subjective prior information gathered from TV and the factual observations. It is unknown
how the neural representation of this forecast integrates the prior knowledge with the actual fre-
quencyof experiencedoutcomes. Bayesianprobabilities combineprior knowledgeandempirical ob-
servations in an optimalway,whereas frequencies only dependon empirical observations.
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Participants performed eight trials of the ball betting task, eight trials
of the bin betting task, eight trials of ball betting task again, and eight
trials of the bin betting task again. At the beginning of the session, the
computer randomly chose whether participants started with eight trials
of the ball betting task or eight trials of the bin betting task. Within a
block of eight trials, the color–payoff association or the bin–payoff asso-
ciation changed after four trials. This way, the effect of stimulus value and
probability could be dissociated. Whether the first block started with the
red/right–payoff association or the blue/left–payoff association was cho-
sen randomly at the beginning of each session.
Duration and message
Prior information. The play money at the beginning of the task was $1.
Messages were displayed on the bottom of the screen. Each trial started
with amessage “TotalX” showing the current playmoney (2.5 s). Then
the message “Prior probability” was displayed (3.5 s). The gray triangles
were moved to display the prior information. After 5.5 s, the message
“Fill in the urn” for the ball betting task or “Select the urn” for the bin
betting task was displayed (2 s).
Sampling. The sampling period was an-
nounced with the message “Start sampling” (2
s). A fixation cross was flashed (0.2 s). Colored
balls (stimuli) were shown in the middle of the
screen for 1 s one after another. The inter-
stimulus interval was drawn from a uniform
distribution between 3 and 4 s (jittering).
Betting. The betting period was announced
with the message “Start auction” (3.5 s) fol-
lowed by the message “Your bet on the ball?”
for the ball betting task and “Your bet on the
urn?” for the bin betting task. Participants had
amaximumof 20 s to place their bet bymoving
a vertical gray line on a scale between $0 and $1.
The position of the line was recorded after they
clicked on the track ball button, or after the
time limit was reached. A feedback message
“Bet is X,” indicating the recorded bet, was dis-
played for 3.5 s.
Auction. The auction period was announced
with the message “Select price” (3.5 s). A verti-
cal violet line was moved to reveal the com-
puter price. At the same time, a message
indicating the price “Price is X” and a message
indicating whether the participant won the
auction or not was displayed over 5.5 s.
Final outcome. This period started with
the message “Draw last ball” for the ball bet-
ting task and “Reveal the urn” for the bin
betting task. A fixation cross was flashed
(0.2 s) followed by an interstimulus interval
(3–4 s). Then the color of the ball or the side
of the bin was revealed in the center of the
screen (1 s).
Feedback. After an interstimulus interval
(3–4 s), the payoff associated to the outcome
“Outcome  X” and the net payoff “Net pay-
off  Y” were displayed for 5.5 s. Then a new
trial started.
Predictive models for brain activity
We focus on brain activation correlating with the
probability of occurrence of each type of stimulus,
distinguishable by the color of the ball drawn from
thebin(redorblue for theballbetting task;greenor
orange for the bin betting task).Wemeasure stim-
ulus probabilities in two ways. First, we compute
probabilities ignoring prior information. Hence,
theseprobabilitiesarepurelybasedontheactualfre-
quency of occurrence of the colors.We refer to this
model as “frequentist.” Second, we use Bayesian
posterior beliefs computed from the prior information and the history of sam-
plingof colors.Thismodelwill be referred toas “Bayesian.”Thenaming is inno
waymeant toreflectarguments in thestatistics literatureontherelativemeritsof
using prior information (Bayesian statistics) against considering only the objec-
tive information that couldpossibly emerge (classical frequentist statistics; Fien-
berg,2006).Instead,it isaconvenientwaytodistinguishbetweenupdatingbased
onprior information andupdating excluding prior information (Fig. 1).
Frequentist model. In the frequentist model, we ignore the prior infor-
mation; inference is solely based on the factual drawings. In the ball
betting task, the probability of observing another red ball after recording
k red balls in n prior draws is given by Equation 1:
Pred ballk in n 
k
n
The probability of a blue ball is the complementary of the probability of
a red ball (mutually exclusive events). In the bin betting task, the proba-
bility of observing another green ball after recording k green balls in n
prior draws is given by Equation 2:
a b
Figure 2. a, b, One trial of the ball betting task (a) and bin betting task (b). Prior information: the two gray triangles gave
incomplete prior information on the probability of the rewarded ball (ball betting task) or the rewarded bin (bin betting task).
Sampling: between one and nine balls were drawnwith replacement and shown in the center of the screen. Betting: participants
placedabetbymovingavertical gray lineon the scale. Auction: the computer selectedaprice at randomanddisplayed it bymoving
a vertical violet line; the outcome of the auction was revealed simultaneously. Final outcome: an additional ball was drawn in the
ball betting task and the bin was revealed in the bin betting task. Feedback: payoff and net payoff were displayed.
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Pgreen ballk in n 
k
n
The probability of an orange ball is the complementary probability.
Bayesian model. The Bayesian model combines factual frequencies
with prior knowledge. For the ball betting task, we provide a formula for
the posterior probability that a red ball would be drawn conditional on
the past draws and prior information (about the composition of the bin,
delivered at the beginning of each trial). The random variables are the
following:  indicates the proportion of red balls in the bin, an outcome
of the randomvariable; k is the outcomeof a binomial randomvariable
and denotes the number of red balls observed in n drawings.
At the beginning of each trial, follows a uniform distribution between
[a, b], where a and b denote the positions of the triangles on the screen (0
a b 1). The probability that takes the value  equals the probability
density function of the uniform distribution (we use the symbol P for both
probability density andmass functions) as shown in Equation 3:
P	      1b  a a    b
0 Otherwise
The probability of observing k red balls in n drawings given a certain
proportion of red balls  is given by the density function of the binomial
distribution (0 k n), as shown in Equation 4:
Pk in n	    nk1  nk k
The probability of observing another red ball after recording k red balls in
n previous draws can be calculated with the Bayes’ law, which gives in
Equation 5 the following:
Pred ballk in n 
Beta a, k  2, n  k  1
 Beta b, k  2, n  k  1
Beta a, k  1, n  k  1
 Beta b, k  1, n  k  1
where Beta denotes the incomplete Beta function.
For the bin betting task, the Bayesian model provides the posterior
probability that the right bin is used in the ball drawing. The probability
that draws come from the left bin is complementary to that for the right
bin (mutually exclusive events). We first define the relevant random
variables. LetU denote a variable following a Bernoulli distribution with
parameter  indicating if the left (U 0) or right (U 1) binwas selected
to draw balls.  is the outcome of a random variable . k is a random
variable following a binomial distribution indicating the number of
green balls observed in n drawings. The parameter of this binomial dis-
tribution equaled three-tenths if the left bin was selected (U  0) and
seven-tenths if the right bin was selected (U 1).
At the beginning of each trial, follows a uniform distribution between
[a, b], with a and b given by the position of the triangles on the screen (0
a b 1). The probability that takes the value  equals the probability
density function of the uniform distribution as shown in Equation 6:
P	      1b  a a    b
0 Otherwise
The probability that the bin u ( 0, 1) is selected given  equals the proba-
bilitymass function of the Bernoulli distribution is as follows in Equation 7:
PU  u	      1   u  0 u  1
The probability of observing k green balls in n drawings given u (right or
left bin) equals the probability density function of the binomial distribu-
tion (0 k n) as shown in Equation 8:
Pk in nU  u   
n
k1  Lnk Lk u 0
nk1  Rnk Rk u 1
where R and L denote the probability of drawing a green ball when the
right or left bin is selected, respectively.
To calculate the probability that the right bin was selected, given the
observed data, we apply Bayes’ rule, which in Equation 9 produces:
PU  1k in n

a  b
2
1  Rnk Rk
a  b
2
1  Rnk Rk  1  a  b2 1  Lnk Lk
The probability of observing a green ball after sampling is given by the
following Equation 10:
Pgreen ballk in n
 PU  1k in n R  PU  0k in nL
Predictive models for choices
Participants bet to earn a $1 payoff. It can be shown that the maximum
expected net payoff is obtained when the bet b equals the probability p of
receiving the payoff in the gamble (b p). Thus, it is optimal to place a
bet equal to the probability of winning the gamble. In case the bet is
optimal, the expected net payoff is a quadratic function of the probability
p, as shown in Equation 11:
EZoptimal bet 
p2
2
In the behavioral analysis, we could have used statistical models that
directly predicted the bet. However, risk aversion may bias such an ap-
proach. Specifically, risk-averse participants decrease their bet below
their belief (of winning the gamble) to increase the chance to lose the
auction and hence avoid the gamble altogether. Therefore, we ran anal-
yses on an adjusted bet. When the red ball or right bin was rewarded, the
adjusted bet equaled the observed bet (b); otherwise the adjusted bet was
1 minus the observed bet (1 b). The effect of risk attitude then cancels
out across the two conditions. For simplicity, we refer to the adjusted bet
simply as “bet” or “inferred belief” in the sequel.
Frequentist model. In the ball betting task, the bet was predicted by the
frequency of the red ball (Eq. 1). In the bin betting task, participants bet
on the bin, not the ball. Thus the bet was predicted by the probability that
the right bin was selected conditional on the drawings and a Bayesian
prior probability equal to 1
2
. This way, the prior information was effec-
tively ignored in the model and behavioral response in the two tasks
could be compared. The probability that the right bin was used to draw
balls is given by the following Equation 12:
PU  1k in n 
1  Rnk Rk
1  Rnk Rk  1  Lnk Lk
Bayesian model. In the ball betting task, the bet was predicted by the red
ball probability, calculated with Bayes’ formula (Eq. 5). In the bin betting
task, the bet was predicted by the probability that the right urn was the
one used to draw balls, calculated with Bayes’ formula (Eq. 9).
Behavioral analysis
Bets were predicted with mixed-linear models. Subject was entered as a
random factor to capture individual variability. Mixed linear regressions
were estimated in R with the lme function (R Development Core Team,
2012). See Predictive models for choices for details on the calculation of
frequentis (Eqs. 1 and 12) and Bayesian probabilitie (Eqs. 5 and 9). The
threshold for significance was set at p 0.05.
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Brain analysis
Image acquisition. BOLD fMRI acquisitions were performed with a 32-
channel head coil on a 3 T Siemens Tim-Trio system. Functional MRI
images were acquired with an EPI gradient echo T2*-weighted sequence
[flip angle, 80°; TR, 2000 ms; TE, 30 ms; 64 
 64 matrix, GRAPPA
(generalized autocalibrating partially parallel acquisition) acceleration,
2; voxel size, 3
 3
 3 mm; 38 slices, covering the whole brain].
High resolution morphological data were acquired with a sagittal T1-
weighted 3D magnetization prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo
(MP/RAGE) sequence, 176 slices (with voxel size of 1mm isotropic), as a
structural basis for brain segmentation and surface reconstruction.
Preprocessing. fMRI preprocessing steps, conducted with SPM8 (Well-
come Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom),
included realignment of intrasession acquisitions to correct for head
movement, normalization to a standard template [Montreal Neurologi-
cal Institute template (MNI)] to minimize interparticipant morpholog-
ical variability and resampling to isotropic voxel of 2 
 2 
 2 mm to
improve superposition of functional results and morphological acquisi-
tions, and convolution with an isotropic Gaussian kernel (FWHM, 6
mm) to increase signal-to-noise ratio. The signal drift across acquisitions
was removedwith high-pass filter (only signals with a period240 swere
included).
Voxel-based analysis. Subject was defined as a random factor in general
linear models (GLMs). GLMs were estimated with SPM8. The default
orthogonalization of predictors was removed to avoid arbitrary results
due to predictor order.
GLM events were defined for all messages displayed during the tasks.
Event duration equaled the duration of the messages. In the prior infor-
mation epoch, a GLM event was defined when the two triangles indicat-
ing prior informationmoved from their central positions. The event was
modulated parametrically by the Bayesian expected net payoff calculated
on condition of an optimal bet and with the use of the displayed prior
information. The left-to-right position of the middle point between the
triangles was defined as a second parametric modulator.
During the sampling period, GLM events were defined for the fixation
cross, the interstimulus interval (gray ball), and the stimulus itself (draw-
ing of a ball). The duration of these events in the GLMwas equal to their
duration in the tasks. The stimulus was modulated parametrically by the
number of drawings (balls, regardless of color) since the beginning of the
trial (1, 2, 3, etc.) and the frequency of occurrence of the color (color
probability, GLM1). In a second GLM, Bayesian posterior probabilities
substituted for frequencies to localize the neural representation of sub-
jective beliefs (GLM2). In GLM1 and GLM2, BOLD activity was re-
gressed on the probability of the currently observed stimulus. The
probability of “red” (“blue”) was used when a red (blue) ball was drawn
in the ball betting task. The probability of “green” (“orange”) was used
when a green (orange) ball was drawn in the bin betting task. See Predic-
tive models for brain activity for details on the calculation of frequentist
(Eqs. 1 and 2) and Bayesian probabilities (Eqs. 5 and 10).
Update was substituted for probability as a parametric modulator to
test whether the brain was encoding a change in belief based on the
currently observed stimulus. The update was calculated as the posterior
minus the prior (GLM3), or as the log of the ratio posterior/prior
(GLM4). To test if probabilities were encoded differently depending on
the task, the stimulus probability wasmodulated by the task identity (ball
betting task, 0; bin betting task, 1; GLM5). To test the role of value, the
stimulus was modulated by the Bayesian expected net payoff based on
Equation 6 (GLM6). To further explore the effect of value, the stimulus
was modulated by its associated payoff ($0 or $1) in a separate GLM
(GLM7).
In the betting epoch of both tasks, a GLM event was defined for the
time spent placing the bet. This event was modulated by the left-to-right
position of the middle point between the triangles. A covariate was used
to make the distinction between participants’ placing their bet with the
left (covariate, 0) or right hand (covariate, 1). In the auction epoch, the
message display event was modulated parametrically by the content of
the message; namely, the computer-generated price. In the feedback pe-
riod, a GLM event was defined for the interstimulus interval (gray ball)
that followed the revelation of the final outcome (color of the ball or side
of the bin). This event was modulated by the net payoff.
Seven GLMs were estimated at this point: GLM1 (frequency), GLM2
(Bayesian probability), GLM3 (Bayesian update computed as a differ-
ence), GLM4 (Bayesian update computed as a ratio), GLM5 (task iden-
tity), GLM6 (Bayesian expected net payoff), and GLM7 (payoff). The
appropriate GLM was selected when presenting results related to the
stimulus displayed during the sampling period. Results for the remaining
events were similar for the seven GLMs. We report the estimation found
with GLM2 when presenting results not related to the stimulus. For
voxel-based analyses (including identification of ROIs), the threshold for
significance was set at p 0.001, uncorrected, with minimal cluster size
of 100 voxels. Coordinates are given in the MNI space (millimeters).
ROI analysis. By definition, probabilities calculated with the frequen-
tist and Bayesianmodels are both functions of the observed drawings. As
a consequence, their correlation was relatively high (r 0.66). To docu-
ment their effect at the voxel level, a GLM was estimated separately for
frequentist (GLM1) and Bayesian probabilities (GLM2). We should ob-
serve some overlap in brain activity as the two predictors share informa-
tion. The key analysis was to estimate their unique contribution. To do
so, frequentist and Bayesian probabilities were entered together in the
same regression to explain the average BOLD effect found in a given ROI.
This way, we directly contrasted the two explanatory variables (Poldrack
et al., 2008).
ROIs encoding probabilities were defined bymerging the voxels found
to encode objective frequencies and Bayesian posterior probabilities.
Voxels had to belong to GLM1 or GLM2 clusters of activation (or both).
With this approach, none of the two types of probability was favored in
the definition of the ROIs. To avoid circularity or “double dipping,”
ROIs for each participant were determined based on the data of all other
participants (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009).
The GLMs for the ROI analysis (GLM8) was the same as the GLMs for
the voxel-based analysis (GLM1–GLM7), except that different events
were defined for each drawing of a ball (stimuli) during the sampling
period. These events were not modulated by covariates. GLM8was fitted
to the brain functional data andMarsbar toolbox was used to extract the
first component score of all voxels in a given ROI (Brett et al., 2002). This
was done for each subject separately. Because ROIs for each subject were
estimatedwithout the subject himself, circularity was avoided. Estimated
s were imported in R (R Development Core Team, 2012). In R, mixed
linear regressions (lme function) were computed to predict the  esti-
mated for each stimulus obtained from Marsbar. Consistent with the
voxel-based GLMs, subject was defined as a random factor in R mixed
linear regressions. The threshold was set to p  0.05 when analyzing
average activation in ROIs.
Connectivity analysis. Functional connectivity was analyzed with the
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) toolbox of SPM8. ROIs were used
as seed regions. Connectivity in the sampling period was analyzed with a
GLM fitted on images acquired during the sampling period (physiolog-
ical factor). No experimental variable was included (psychological fac-
tor). As for all other voxel-based GLMs, connectivity analyses included
realignment regressors to control for headmotion (Weissenbacher et al.,
2009). The high-pass filter was maintained at 240 s to allow the compar-
ison of results obtained with the connectivity analyses and the other
GLMs.
Results
Participant choices
Participant bets were first regressed on the Bayesian probabilities.
Results showed that the slope () coefficients were close to 1 and
highly significant in the ball betting task ( 1.15, t(388) 24.60,
p  0.001) as well as in the bin betting task (  0.82, t(388) 
22.64, p 0.001). When probabilities based on the Bayesian and
frequentist models were entered in the same regressions to ex-
plain bets, Bayesian probabilities remained significant in the ball
and bin betting tasks (respectively   0.86, t(387)  14.16,
p  0.001;   0.62, t(387)  11.33, p  0.001). The effect of
objective frequencies was smaller but still significant in both tasks
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(  0.22, t(387)  5.14, p  0.001;   0.22, t(387)  3.26, p 
0.001), indicating that participant beliefs were slightly biased by
the factual stimulus frequencies away from full Bayesian posteri-
ors (Fig. 3). Belief about the outcome was unaffected by its asso-
ciated value ($0 or $1) in the two tasks (p 0.92; p 0.84). Thus
values did not influence beliefs, a rational strategy because values
were irrelevant to estimate outcome probabilities (Savage, 1954).
When data of the two tasks were concatenated and a factor
defining the task was created (ball betting task, 0; bin betting task,
1), the effect of Bayesian probabilities was greater (  0.86,
t(799) 14.05, p 0.001) compared with frequencies (regardless
of the task). Frequencies still had a significant effect on choices
(  0.23, t(799)  4.60, p  0.001). The Bayesian probability–
task interaction was significant (0.23, t(799)2.92, p
0.004), but the frequentist probability–task interaction was not
(0.01, t(799)0.16, p 0.87). Overall, Bayesian proba-
bilities better explained bets, suggesting that participants effec-
tively took into account prior information when making
predictions. Integrating prior information with observed evi-
dence was more difficult in the bin betting task compared with
the ball betting task.
Brain activation
Prior information epoch
At the beginning of a trial, the (prior) probability of receiving the
$1 payoff was equal to the value of the point situated midway
between the two triangles. The expected net payoff (payoff minus
expected price) was a quadratic function of this probability (Eq.
11), provided that participants would place the optimal bet at the
end of the trial.
Results showed significant activation in the occipital cortex
related to the left–right position of the triangles on the screen.
This indicates that participants were paying attention to the in-
formation provided at the beginning of the trial (Fig. 4a). When
the triangles moved to the left side of the screen, more activation
was observed in the left occipital cortex. This can be explained
because the bin(s) in the center of the screen created more lumi-
nescence in the right visual field when participants looked to the
left. Consistent with documented involvement of striatal regions
in signaling expected rewards (O’Doherty et al., 2004), the ex-
pected net payoff was correlated with BOLD signal in left caudate
(Fig. 5a).
Sampling epoch
Brain activity during sampling from the unknown bin was re-
gressed on the probability of the stimulus displayed in the center
of the screen (the color of the ball drawn). Results of the first
voxel-based analysis (GLM1) showed a parametric and positive
effect of objective frequencies in bilateral angular gyrus, posterior
cingulate cortex (reaching the retrosplenial cortex), and dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex (Fig. 6a). These regions belong to the
default mode network (Buckner and Andrews-Hanna, 2008).
Additional activation was observed in the left middle frontal
gyrus. The positive effect means that activity in these regions
increased significantly with the frequency of a stimulus (color).
Bayesian probabilities had also a positive effect in a subset of these
regions (GLM2, Fig. 6b). However, when the two types of prob-
abilities were entered in the same regression, ROI analyses
showed that all these regions tracked objective frequencies
only (yellow bars), unaffected by prior information (Fig. 6c,
red bars). The negative and significant effect of Bayesian prob-
abilities in the right angular gyrus (red bar) was due to a
suppressor effect. When entered alone, Bayesian probabilities
were not significantly related to BOLD signal in this ROI (p
0.60). Also, no voxels were activated in response to Bayesian
probabilities in right angular gyrus (Figure 6b, bottom).
BOLD activity decreased when a stimulus was presented
(green bars) and increased with the number of drawings (vio-
let bars) displayed since the beginning of the trial.
Result of the second voxel-based analysis (GLM2) revealed a
parametric and negative effect of Bayesian posterior probabilities
in right supramarginal gyrus, supplementary motor area, and
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (Fig. 7a). Activity in inferior fron-
tal gyrus reached the pars opercularis and the precentral gyrus (it
is thus a posterior activation). The negative effect means that
BOLD signal significantly increased for stimuli believed to be
improbable based on an optimal combination of prior informa-
tion and factual evidence. Frequencies had a negative effect in a
subset of the same regions (GLM1; Fig. 7b). When the two types
of probabilities were entered in the regressions, ROI analyses
showed that BOLD response in left and right inferior frontal
gyrus was uniquely related to the Bayesian probability of stimuli
(red bars), and not to their objective frequency of occurrence
(Fig. 7c, yellow bars). This was not the case in the supramarginal
gyrus and supplementary motor area, where Bayesian probabili-
ties lost significant explanatory power after objective frequencies
were entered in the same regression. BOLD response increased
when a ball was displayed on the screen, suggesting an attentional
response (Fig. 7c, green bars). Like for the ROI encoding frequen-
cies, BOLD activity increased with the number of drawings (vio-
let bars). A 3D rendering of the voxel encoding frequencies and
Bayesian “improbabilities” is shown in Figure 8a.
We tested for neural stepwise encoding of Bayesian beliefs by
correlating BOLD signal with the difference between the prior
and the posterior after the observation of a stimulus (color)
(GLM3). Significant correlation failed to emerge (figures for null
results are not reported). The logarithm of the ratio of posterior
over prior (Baldi and Itti, 2010) likewise failed to produce signif-
icant results (GLM4). As such, activation correlating with Bayes-
ian improbability did not mask encoding of stepwise Bayesian
updates.
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Figure 3. Participant beliefs as a function of outcome probabilities. The following beliefs
were inferred from bets: the belief that a red ball would be drawn (ball betting task) or that the
right binwas used to drawballs (bin betting task). Outcomeprobabilitieswere calculatedbased
on only the observed balls (frequentist) or computed by optimally integrating prior information
with observed frequencies (Bayesian). A linear model was fit to beliefs with the two types of
probabilities entered simultaneously as explanatory variables, as well as a dummy variable for
condition (whether the redball/right binwas associatedwith the$1payoff). Heights of thebars
represent t values (relative effect size). Dotted line indicates significance at p 0.05.
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To further test the functional special-
ization of the brain, the interaction be-
tween the ROI location and the effect of
probability was tested with a single mixed
linear regression after concatenating data
of selected ROIs in R (Henson, 2005). A
location factor was defined and set to 0 for
ROI encoding frequencies (bilateral angu-
lar gyrus, posterior cingulate, left middle
frontal gyrus, and medial prefrontal cor-
tex) and to 1 for ROI encoding Bayesian
probabilities (bilateral inferior frontal
gyrus). The regression also included the
number of drawings since the beginning
of the trial and the interaction between
that number and the ROI location. If the
effect size of frequentist and Bayesian
probabilities happened to be the same in
these two subsets of ROIs, the interaction
with the location might be significant
because the effects of frequencies are op-
posite those of Bayesian probabilities
(positive effect for frequencies, negative
for Bayesian probabilities). To rule out
this possibility, the Bayesian regressor was
transformed into the complementary
probability (1 p). After this transforma-
tion, a significant interaction effect will
indicate that the effect magnitude (re-
gardless of its sign) is larger in one subset
of ROIs compared with the other. Results
showed that BOLD response to the stim-
ulus presentation was stronger in the
Bayesian ROIs, suggesting that these re-
gions belong to an attentional network
(  2.01, t(25,659)  10.29, p  0.001).
Results also confirmed that BOLD re-
sponse in the frequency ROIs increased
with the number of drawings (  0.38,
t(25,659)  3.78, p  0.001) and the effect
was stronger in the Bayesian ROIs ( 
0.34, t(25,659) 5.02, p 0.001). This sug-
gests a general increase of brain activity
with information load, particularly in at-
tentional regions. While the effect of fre-
quencies in the frequentist ROIs was
significant ( 0.58, t(25,659) 6.42, p
0.001), the effect of Bayesian probabilities
was not (0.10, t(25,659)1.70, p
0.09). The same regression was estimated
after setting the location factor to 0 for the
Bayesian ROIs and 1 to the frequentist
ROIs. Results showed that, in the Bayesian
ROIs, the effect of Bayesian probabilities
was significant ( 0.32, t(25,659) 4.58,
p  0.001) but the effect of frequencies
was not (  0.02, t(25,659)  0.21, p 
0.84). Crucially, the frequentist probabili-
ty–ROI location interaction and Bayesian
probability–ROI location interaction
were both significant and the sign of each
interaction showed that the effect of fre-
quencies was stronger in the frequentist
Figure 6. Positive effects of probabilities in the sampling period (BOLD response to likelihood of stimuli). a, Effect of factual
frequencies in bilateral angular gyrus, posterior cingulate cortex, middle frontal gyrus, and medial prefrontal cortex (GLM1). b,
Effect of Bayesian posterior probabilities (red, GLM2) superimposed on the effect of factual frequencies (yellow, GLM1). c, Effect of
frequencies and Bayesian probabilities when entered in the same regression to explain BOLD response in each of the ROIs.
a b c
Figure4. Visual andmotor activation.a, BOLD response occipital cortex during the prior information period as a function of the
left-to-right position of the triangles (ipsilateral activation). b, BOLD response in occipital cortex during the betting period as a
function of the left-to-right position of the triangles (ipsilateral activation). c, BOLD response in primary motor cortex during the
betting period as a function of the use of the left or right hand to place the bet (controlateral activation).
a b c
Figure 5. Brain activation in striatum as a function of value. a, Activation during the prior information period in left caudate as
a function of the expected net payoff based on the displayed information. b, BOLD response in bilateral caudate increased as the
computer-generated price decreased in the auction epoch. c, Activation in bilateral striatum as a function of the net payoff during
the feedback epoch.
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ROIs (  0.57, t(25,659)  3.64, p 
0.001) and the effect of Bayesian probabil-
ities was stronger in the Bayesian ROIs
(0.42, t(25,659)4.10, p 0.001).
Additional GLM analyses of BOLD
signal proved that the effect of stimulus
probabilities did not interact with task
condition (ball betting vs bin betting,
GLM5). Contrary to the imaging results
for the prior information epoch, we found
no significant neural effect of the expected
net payoff (calculated using Bayesian pos-
teriors, GLM6). When stimulus value ($0
or $1) was substituted in the GLM for ex-
pected net payoff, significant correlation
failed to emerge (GLM7). Thus, during
sampling, the brain tracked stimulus
probabilities instead of stimulus values or
net expected payoff.
To ascertain to what extent objective
frequencies and Bayesian probabilities
were processed in a common or distinct
brain network, we resorted to connectivity analysis. The left and
right angular gyrus ROIs (encoding objective frequencies) were
taken as seed regions in a first analysis (Fig. 8a). The left and right
inferior frontal ROIs (encoding Bayesian “improbabilities”) were
defined as seed regions in a second analysis (Fig. 8a). A paired t
test was computed in SPM to highlight voxels connected more
strongly with angular than with inferior frontal gyrus ROIs (or
vice versa).
Results showed that voxels in posterior cingulate cortex, mid-
dle temporal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex correlated
more with activity in angular gyrus during the sampling (Fig.
8b,c). These regions overlap with the default mode network,
which is formed by the following structures: medial temporal
lobes (including the hippocampus), lateral temporal lobes, infe-
rior parietal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and medial pre-
frontal cortex (both dorsal and ventral regions; Buckner and
Andrews-Hanna, 2008).
Voxels in parietal cortex (but not in angular gyrus), pre-
central gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus correlated more with
activity in inferior frontal gyrus (Fig. 8b,c). This was also true
for voxels in middle cingulate cortex and insula. There is a
large overlap between this network and the attentional net-
work (Corbetta et al., 2005). Thus regions encoding the fre-
quency and Bayesian probability of stimuli were part of
functionally distinct neural networks.
Betting, auction, and final outcome epoch
As in the prior information epoch, we found visual activity re-
lated to the left–right position of the triangles when participants
placed their bets (Fig. 4b).Motor activity related to the hand used
to place the bet was also observed (Fig. 4c). After the auction,
activation of bilateral striatumwas correlatedwith the computer-
drawn price that determined whether the participant won the
auction and, hence, could play the gamble against payment of
the drawn price. BOLD response increased with decreasing
computer-drawn prices (Fig. 5b). After the gamble outcome was
displayed (color of the final ball drawn in the ball betting task or
revelation of the true bin from which the drawing happened in
the bin betting task), activity in striatum increasedwith payoff net
of price paid (Fig. 5c).
Result summary
In two probability learning tasks, analysis of fMRI BOLD signal
revealed that objective frequencies were encoded in angular
gyrus, posterior cingulate cortex, and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex. As to beliefs that combined recorded frequencies with
prior information, activation in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus
correlated negatively with Bayesian posterior probabilities. No
activation correlatingmerelywith Bayesian updateswas detected.
Connectivity analysis showed that regions encoding objective fre-
quencies belonged to a larger network known as the defaultmode
network. Regions encoding Bayesian probabilities belonged to a
separate network, which one could identify as the attentional
network. At the beginning of trials, expected reward inferred
from prior knowledge was correlated to BOLD response in stria-
tum. The same region was related to price and net payoff at the
end of trials.
Figure 7. Negative effects of probabilities in the sampling period (BOLD response to surprise measured by 1 minus the likeli-
hood of the observed stimulus). a, Effect of Bayesian posterior probabilities in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, right supramarginal
gyrus, and medial supplementary motor area (GLM2). b, Effect of frequencies (yellow, GLM1) superimposed on the effect of
Bayesian probabilities (red, GLM2). c, Effect of factual frequencies and Bayesian probabilities when entered simultaneously in the
regression to explain BOLD response in each of the ROIs. Bayesian probabilities had a negative and significant effect in inferior
frontal gyri. Factual frequencies had a negative and significant effect in supplementary motor area. The pattern was mixed in the
supramarginal gyrus.
a b c
Figure 8. Connectivity analysis in the sampling period. a, 3D rendering of the BOLD
response to objective frequencies (green, GLM1) and Bayesian improbabilities (red,
GLM2). b, In green are the voxels significantly related to activity in angular gyrus ROIs
(1–2, encoding frequencies). The pattern of connectivity was characteristic of the default
mode network with activation along the middle temporal gyrus. In red are the voxels
significantly related to activity in inferior frontal gyrus ROIs (6 –7, encoding Bayesian
improbabilities). Regions formed part of the attentional network. c, Cross-sectional view
of the connectivity results (1–2, angular gyrus).
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Discussion
The main contribution of this study is to uncover a dual system
for inference: an experience-based system and a knowledge-
based system. The first system only tracked the objective likeli-
hood of the evidence/stimuli. The second system took into
account prior knowledge to form posterior beliefs. The existence
of a dual neural system was further supported by participants’
choices: bets were mainly Bayesian, but biased significantly to-
ward reflecting objective frequencies. Importantly, these two sys-
tems of inference operated independently of value, which was
encoded in striatum.
Several arguments can be advanced for the role of memory to
explain the positive correlation between frequency and BOLD
response in angular gyrus, posterior cingulate, and medial pre-
frontal cortex (MPFC). The angular gyrus supports the retrieval
of episodic and semantic information frommemory (Binder and
Desai, 2011). It is more activated for “hits” during the test phase
of memory tasks (old/new effect, Kim, 2013). According to the
mnemonic accumulator model, activation in the angular gyrus
quantifies the match between a probe and representations stored
elsewhere in the brain (Guerin and Miller, 2011; Levy, 2012).
Several models based on the retrieval and summation of traces
stored in memory have been developed to explain how people
judge probabilities (Hintzman and Block, 1971; Dougherty et al.,
1999). These “exemplar models” can account for the availability
effect by which people overestimate the probability of events that
easily come to their mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). We
propose that the angular gyrus contributes to the estimation of
probabilities by activating traces of past events in memory.
The inferior parietal lobule and its mnemonic function has
been found to compete with attentional processes located in the
superior parietal lobule (Guerin et al., 2012). Likewise, our con-
nectivity analysis highlighted a distinction between angular gyrus
embedded in the default mode network (DMN) andmore dorsal
regions embedded in an attentional network (see Fig. 8c). The
DMN also exists in monkeys (Mantini et al., 2011, 2013) and a
recent study has shown that neurons in inferior parietal cortex
were activated by the recognition of old items (Miyamoto et al.,
2013). On the other hand, neurons in the lateral intraparietal area
have been found to encode the amount of evidence in perceptual
decision-making tasks (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Huk and
Shadlen, 2005; Tosoni et al., 2008). We thus formulate the hy-
pothesis that parietal neurons belonging to the DMN are special-
ized in accumulating evidence retrieved from memory, whereas
neurons located in dorsal regions accumulate sensory evidence.
Lesions in posterior cingulate cortex leads tomemory impair-
ments (Bowers et al., 1988; Aggleton, 2010). Imaging studies in-
dicate that this region is activated during the encoding of spatial/
contextual information (Epstein, 2008; Szpunar et al., 2009). The
posterior cingulate cortex has been shown to be responsible for
the formation of stimulus–stimulus associations in rats (Robin-
son et al., 2011). A possible explanation of our results is that
activity in posterior cingulate cortex measures the associative
strength between a stimulus (ball displayed in the center of the
screen) and its context (entire screen).
The MPFC was the third region found to encode frequencies.
It has been related to prospective thinking (D’Argembeau et al.,
2008), theory of mind (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009), and autobio-
graphical memory (Cabeza et al., 2004). In nonautobiographical
memory tasks, it is more activated for items that spontaneously
evoke associations (Peters et al., 2009) and during the formation
of indirect associations (Zeithamova et al., 2012). It also partici-
pates to the consolidation of memories (Takashima et al., 2007).
The importance of theMPFC formemory is supported by studies
in rodents (Takehara-Nishiuchi and McNaughton, 2008; Peters
et al., 2013). Authors have observed that dopaminergic efflux in
the rat MPFC peaked during the study and test phases of a mem-
ory task. The level of dopamine did not increase when the animal
reached a reward (Phillips et al., 2004), contrary to what is ob-
served in striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (Schultz et al., 2000).
A meta-analysis in humans has revealed that the ventral MPFC,
with its connections to the limbic system, was preferentially re-
lated to the encoding of value and emotion. More dorsal regions,
with their connections to the DMN, were preferentially related to
memory (Roy et al., 2012). We found that frequencies were en-
coded in the dorsal MPFC, possibly because events were neutral
and impersonal (colored balls). Overall, the encoding of frequen-
cies in MPFC fits well with the importance of this region in both
memory and decision making (for review, see Euston et al.,
2012). We suggest that an important function of the MPFC is to
support social inference and prospective thinking by encoding
the probability of future events.
Previous studies have shown that the hippocampus was acti-
vated in an associative version of the weather prediction task
when comparedwith a procedural version (Poldrack et al., 2001).
Onemight wonder why this structure did not correlate positively
with frequencies in our parametric design. Complementary
learning theory suggests that the hippocampus is specialized in
encoding events as separate episodes, whereas neocortical regions
are responsible for memorizing general features (McClelland et
al., 1995; Xu and Sudhof, 2013). For example, estimating the
probability of finding a parking spot in a given street requires a
driver to extract information from multiple episodes and hence
to rely on neocortical regions, as observed in the present study. In
addition, the hippocampus reacts to novel events (Li et al., 2003;
Lisman and Grace, 2005) and its activity decreases with stimulus
repetition (Suzuki et al., 2011; d’Acremont et al., 2013). Thus, the
hippocampus is not in a good position to positively encode fre-
quencies that increase with the repetition of events. The hip-
pocampus might be necessary but not sufficient to estimate
probabilities.
The middle temporal cortex is the fifth and last node of the
DMN. We found that it was functionally connected to the angu-
lar gyrus, but it did not encode frequencies. Lesion and imaging
studies have shown that this region was implicated in semantic
memory (Binder et al., 2009; Groussard et al., 2010). The estima-
tion of frequencies was based on the repetitive observation of
stimuli in the two tasks. They are thus likely to recruit episodic
rather than semantic memory and this might explain why the
lateral temporal cortex did not encode probabilities.
As to the knowledge-based system, we discovered a negative
correlation between BOLD signal in inferior frontal gyrus and
Bayesian probabilities. As such, “improbability,” or surprise rel-
ative to subjective beliefs, was being encoded. Several studies have
reported a BOLD response in inferior frontal gyrus when partic-
ipants observed rare events (Linden et al., 1999), inhibitedmotor
responses to rare targets (go/no-go and stop signal) (Hampshire
et al., 2010), observed statistical outliers (risk prediction error;
d’Acremont et al., 2009), received information that violates their
expectation (Sharot et al., 2011), or noticed infrequent changes
(task switching; Konishi et al., 1998). Our study suggests that
these results could have a common explanation: the encoding of
event improbability. For the first time, our finding qualifies the
encoding as subjective, in the sense that it reflects surprise based
on a combination of prior knowledge with evidence. Locus coer-
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uleus activity varies with attention (Aston-Jones and Bloom,
1981) and increases in response to low-probability targets in
monkeys (Aston-Jones and Rajkowski, 1994). Its noradrenergic
projections might thus be partly responsible for the Bayesian
surprise observed in inferior frontal gyrus.
For a Bayesian, once new evidence is incorporated to form a
posterior, it can be discarded, because the posterior is all she
needs tomove ahead. Against this background, it may be surpris-
ing that the brain chooses to compute both objective frequencies
and subjective beliefs. However frequentist inference is adaptive
because it protects the decision maker from arbitrary priors
(Efron, 2005). In addition, keeping track of objective evidence
offers more flexibility to a Bayesian in case an initial prior needs
to be revised (Epstein and Schneider, 2007). Finally, Bayesian
solutions are often intractable and frequentist sampling is needed
to approximate the posterior probability distribution. To take
into account human cognition limitations, authors have devel-
opedBayesianmodels based on the repeated sampling of traces in
memory (Shi et al., 2010). Our results showed that frequentist
and Bayesian probabilities were encoded in parallel. However, we
have not demonstrated that the Bayesian signal in inferior frontal
gyrus depended on the activity observed in nodes of the DMN, a
result that would favor “exemplarmodels” of Bayesian inference.
This hypothesis would be supported if one observed that activi-
ties in the experience-based and knowledge-based systems suf-
fered from the same biases (e.g., availability effect) or that
frequencies were encoded before Bayesian probabilities (using
the time resolution of EEG). These questions need to be ad-
dressed in future research.
Notes
Supplemental material for this article is available at sites.google.
com/site/mathieudacremont/file/BeliefFormationSI.pdf. This material
includes supplementary method, figures, and tables (with false discovery
rate). This material has not been peer reviewed.
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